Kierkegaard and Schelling: The Life of Becoming by Ejsing, Anette
Kierkegaard and Schelling: 
The Life of Becoming
Anette Ejsing
1. T h e M iracle o f  S elf
In addition to the loss of oneself, the most radical loss of all is to also lose 
hope in the source from which one can receive ones self, »because despair 
is indeed the loss of the eternal and of oneself« (SD 62; SV2 11,196).1 It is 
one thing not to have a self, but quite another not to anticipate ever acquir­
ing one; this is, perhaps, the deepest kind of suffering there is.The question 
is, however, whether such suffering is solely negative in its effects. It might 
just be, as Kierkegaard suggests, that despair is escorted by its own opposite 
— possibility — which would entail recovering the hope of redemption from 
despair:
When someone faints, we call for water, eau de Cologne, smelling salts; 
but when someone wants to despair, then the word is: Get possibility, get 
possibility, possibility is the only salvation. A possibility -  then the person 
in despair breathes again, he revives again, for without possibility a person 
seems unable to breathe (SD 38; SV2 11,170f.).
Experiencing despair in its ultimate sense of losing hope means entering a 
state of suffering that exceeds the pain of mere deprivation. In 
Kierkegaard s view, despair has three aspects. It involves the despair of either 
desperately not wanting to be what one already is or of desperately want­
ing to be exactly that, both of which he identifies as rebellious attitudes 
towards ones creator. But despair is also caused by something other than 
these uneducated and regretful attitudes: The sufferings of despair are not 
only deserved but also imposed, so that »in a Promethean way, the ... self 
feels itself nailed to this servitude« (SD 70; SV2 11, 205); the self experi­
ences the constraints of what creation has destined it to become. The fact
that despair is imposed prevents a person from fulfilling the requirement of 
becoming what he or she should become by virtue of creation, even if that 
should be desired. Despair has become a trap. This is the third aspect of 
despair, and the one most easily forgotten. To believe that the self is realiz­
able through the powers of choice alone is an immature confusion »in dem 
die spätere Existenzphilosophie, jedenfalls die deutsche, oft hängenge­
blieben ist.«2 Yet the unhappy paradox -  that self-realization is both an 
impossibility and a requirement — reveals an escape: To hope against hope 
that what is now only possible could be actualized is the miracle of the self. 
For Kierkegaard, it is even illusory to postulate that anything could be real 
apart from the miracle of redemptive faith:
... the critical decision does not come until a person is brought to his 
extremity, when, humanly speaking, there is no possibility.Then the ques­
tion is whether he will believe that for God everything is possible, that is, 
whether he will believe (SD 38; SV2 11,170).
Because despair is partly imposed, a miraculous redemption of self involves 
the mystery that God can afford to burden creation through suffering and 
still preserve the status as sovereign redeemer from suffering. That despair 
should be a divinely imposed affliction is truly a disconcerting circum­
stance which requires that one must always be prepared to suffer. »The rea­
son for this is that to despair is a qualification of spirit and relates to the 
eternal in man ... he cannot rid himself of the eternal — no, never in all 
eternity« (SD 17; SV2 11, 147). Despair is not simply a result of self­
estrangement, or estrangement from God; nor is it neutralized by self­
acceptance or restitution of the self’s relationship to God. Rather, suffering 
is an inescapable component of one’s relation to oneself (a relation that 
constitutes the self), even when the self has not deserved the suffering that 
happens to come its way: »For despair is not attributable to the misrelation 
but to the relation that relates itself to itself« (SD 17; SV2 11, 147). 
Kierkegaard’s challenging contention is that suffering is part of existence 
and that consequently the human self is essentially hypothetical; it is essen­
tially a becoming. A new challenge to overcome despair always lies in wait: 
»wirkliches Selbstsein ist keine ‘erfüllte’ Möglichkeit wie Wirklichkeit 
sonst; es ist bloss ‘die zunichte gemachte Möglichkeit’ der Verzweiflung.«3
The difficulty is that it still seems impossible for Kierkegaard to main­
tain the hypothetical self without also envisioning a »state of the self when 
despair is completely rooted out« (SD 14; SV2, 11,145). How can the self
be defined by two contradictory, but coexisting, principles: that of always 
being on the way and that of being on the way towards completion? Strug­
gling with this problem, Walter Schulz appropriates the principles of Chris­
tian incarnation and advances the theological response that because God 
has appeared in human form it is meaningless to seek escape from the con­
straints of that very form. God’s incarnation in Christ is — in itself — an 
emancipation of finite existence; it is a reinstatement of the finite as finite. 
Therefore, human redemption is actualized by acknowledging that God’s 
taking on human form is the ultimate affirmation of the human condition 
as it is: »um das Ewige zu erlangen, darf der Mensch nicht die Zeit über­
schreiten, sondern muss gerade in die Zeit hineingehen, weil in ihr allein 
das Ewige zu finden ist.«4 The parallel between our human existence on 
one side, and God’s appearance as a human being on the other, is taken to 
demonstrate that the entrapping reality of suffering should not be consid­
ered to be decisive. Schulz’ suggestion must therefore imply that there is a 
certain illusory quality to the sufferings of despair: Realizing that God has 
affirmed humanity as it is, we »kann nun ohne Verzweiflung weiterleben.«5 
Suffering is remedied through recollection of the incarnation event — that 
is, by remembrance. In so far as despair is experienced as an entrapping and 
intruding reality over whose disruptive power the human being does not 
have ultimate control, Schulz’ point also implies that there is a certain illu­
sory quality to the reality of evil. The question is, however, to what extent 
Schulz’ equation of the power of remembrance and the power of redemp­
tion is a viable response to the problem of evil. Attempting to formulate an 
answer to this question, we now turn to F.WJ. Schelling, particularly his 
wrestling with the German idealist notion of human subjectivity as it 
comes forth in his later philosophy.
2. Idealist Subjectivity Dismissed:
T he Powerlessness o f  R eason
According to Hegel, reality cannot be defined in terms of a separation 
between human rationality and the world; reality exists within human sub­
jectivity as its rational thought movement. This definition of reality is a 
product of Hegel’s philosophy and the prime principle of idealist thinking. 
It has served as the basis for many a theoretical response to the problem of 
devising a general explanatory principle to the unification of what many 
hold to be reality’s two antithetical principles: the inevitability of complex­
ity and the vision of unity. In the present context this problem is seen as a
parallel to Kierkegaard’s paradoxical description of the self as essentially 
hypothetical and striving towards completion.
In accordance with Hegel, Schelling insists that all true philosophy is 
idealist philosophy He agrees that reality is fundamentally rational and 
only comprehensible by means of rational reflection. Yet he is still pro­
voked by the pretension that reason should be derived from itself, and he 
therefore charges Hegel with leaving reason to itself in an eternally rest­
less circle of meaninglessness — like a worm incessantly eating its own tail, 
achieving neither life nor death. Schelling cannot but ask: »warum ist 
überhaupt etwas? warum ist nicht nichts?«6 He realizes that »das Wissen 
den absoluten Erkenntnisakt nur reproduziert, als auch eine Begründung 
dafür geliefert, warum das Wissen sich selbst als unhintergehbaren Anfang 
behaupten muss.«7 Reason cannot account for its own power and will 
have to concede that it must be defined in terms of powerlessness. In 
Schelling’s description, then, reflection is a self-circulating but also self- 
transcending movement that advances beyond itself to a point where it 
encounters its own facticity and limitation: ‘Erstarrt, quasi attonita,’ reason 
is confronted by its own ‘dasshafte Wesenlosigkeit,’ the very fact that it is. 
The important point is that reason suddenly becomes more than a negat­
ed power as it realizes the fact that even before exercising its own power 
(which leads to its self-negation) it necessarily is negated reason. At the 
pinnacle of its capacity, reason materializes and is thereby authorized to be 
the thing it always was. Through an uncovering of the powerlessness of 
reason, reason is reinstated as reason.
This means that Schelling has managed to revoke the idealist vision of 
defining human subjectivity in terms of pure rationality alone: »In 
Schelling vollzieht sich erstmalig die Bewegung, in der die sich über­
steigende Subjektivität in sich selbst zu kreisen beginnt.«8 Or, redefining 
subjectivity in a more structural language: Human subjectivity is a pre-estab­
lished and self-affirming twofold movement o f‘Aus-sich-herausgehens’and ‘In-sich- 
zuriickkehrens.’ With Schelling, the human subject has claimed the pre- 
rational nature of its own existence, and implicitly also brought closure to 
any further progress of idealist thought, since the future of its central cate­
gory, human subjectivity, has come to a halt and can reach no next devel­
opmental level.
For Schelling, a reinstatement of reason as reason is the same as a reve­
lation of God’s reality. His God is the God of the philosophical system, the 
source and pure initiation of being. When compared with this God, reason 
is realized to be what it always has been, derived and negated being. This
also entails, for Schelling, that a philosophical system is possible only as a per 
se religious system, and that the discipline of speculative religious philoso­
phy is sanctioned because reason can now be depended upon as a means of 
acquiring insight into Gods metaphysical and eternal truths. Hence,ration­
al philosophy has acknowledged the necessity of conceding that human 
subjectivity can no longer be defined apart from intimate relatedness to 
divine reality. Not in the way of a formal capitulation to the inevitable. 
Rather, a new urgency has been given to the task of formulating this relat­
edness in a manner that preserves the integrity of human freedom and 
divine freedom concurrently, and at the same time emphasizes the impos­
sibility of analyzing the two in separation from each other. The point to be 
taken from Schelling is his paradoxical statement that the experience of 
ultimate powerlessness and the experience of ultimate freedom are two 
sides of the same coin; one does not exist without the other.
3. H um an Freedom  and the Source o f  Evil in G od
On the heels of Schelling s validation of speculative religious philosophy 
follow the most original and controversial parts of his philosophy. Con­
vinced that the world is a product of Gods absolute freedom, Schelling is 
persuaded that actual world history is a direct empirical mirror of God’s 
nature, and he therefore takes on the task of writing out the world history 
of mythology and revelation. This project is met by very high expectations 
on the part of those who now hope they have finally found a thinker to 
provide the arguments needed »um die Drachensaat des Hegelschen Pan­
theismus zu bekämpfen.«9 Unfortunately, Schelling never arrives at a point 
where he can deal effectively with the anthropological aspects anticipated 
to be the culmination of his philosophical talent, and he ends up losing his 
way in the expanding labyrinths of his own speculative project. As 
Schelling’s famous Berlin lectures on mythology and revelation increase in 
metaphysical obscurity they decrease in conceptual clearness, and the high 
hopes soon turn disappointed.
In my judgment, this disappointment is an indication of Schelling s 
inability to balance the intimate relatedness of human freedom and divine 
freedom in such a way that the integrity of both is preserved. Furthermore, 
I will argue that this inability is closely related to the way he responds to 
the theodicy problem. Qualifying this, it is necessary to introduce another 
philosopher, Jakob Böhme, who enjoyed a strong renaissance among Ger­
man Romantics and therefore also plays a central role in Schelling s think-
ing. For my present purposes, his response to the theodicy problem is the 
point of special interest.
Schelling’s defense of God’s uncompromised sovereignty allows him to 
embrace Böhmes claim that evil must have its ontological origin in God 
and that it must be a real and positive part of God. In agreement with 
Böhme, Schelling argues that if this were not the case, it would be impos­
sible to acknowledge genuine evil without granting it a restraining influ­
ence upon God’s power. This leads Schelling to question the assumption 
that evil can be reconciled with any rationalist system that presumes the 
cohesion of all things. In a bold move, he directs this common idealist cri­
tique of pantheism against idealist thought itself: »alle Philosophie, 
schlechthin alle, die nur rein vernunftmässig ist, ist oder wird Spinozis- 
mus!«10 He asserts that pantheism and idealism alike deprive the human 
subject of the freedom of self-determination; they are and remain fatalistic. 
Schelling’s claim now is that the reality of evil within God is conditioned by 
human freedom, which he takes to be the cause of the emancipation of the 
irrational powers of darkness and evil originating within God. Arguing an 
ontological rootedness of evil in God, Schelling develops his doctrine of 
God’s potencies and makes human freedom account for the presence of evil as an 
independent -  but subordinate — power of irrationality and darkness within God. 
God has two opposing poles: necessity and freedom. God’s necessity is sub­
ject to God’s freedom and consists of three dynamically interrelated powers 
or potencies: Contraction, expansion and the unity of both. The first two 
potencies of God are defined as the opposing powers of darkness and light, 
evil and good, real and ideal.The third potency is the unity of these two anti­
thetical potencies; that is, the spontaneous and continued transformation of 
the first potency of contraction into the second potency of expansion: »the 
eternal end of the process of alternation, the goal that is always present.«11 
God’s potencies exhibit a double reality of unity and circular three-ness:
Jede dieser Mächte kann fiir sich seyn; denn die Einheit ist Einheit für
sich, und jedes der Entgegengesetzten ist ganzes vollständiges Wesen; doch
kann keines seyn, ohne dass die andern auch sind, denn nur zusammen
erfüllen sie den ganzen Begriff der Gottheit.12
The three potencies necessarily order themselves in this mode of contin­
ued transformation and emerge in opposition to God’s freedom and sec­
ond pole, the highest principle of pure will within God, purus actus. Now, 
in the presence of God’s freedom, the potencies intensely desire redemp­
tion from their compulsive and circular inter-relatedness, and only as they 
find themselves ‘dynamically fixed’ in subservience to God’s freedom can 
they exist as an organic whole, »not something that ‘happens’ to or in God 
but ... an aspect of his eternal reality.«13 It is the supremacy of God’s free­
dom over God’s necessity that establishes God’s divine reality.
It is necessary to understand this rather complex description of God’s 
inner life in order to see how Schelling can attribute absolute importance 
to human freedom in a preservation of God’s sovereignty in the face of evil. 
The lead idea is that human subjectivity has mastery over God’s potencies 
by virtue of its immediate and not-yet-self-conscious nature, i.e. »[e]r hat 
über sie Macht nur, wenn er sich nicht bewegt (keine aktuelle, sondern nur 
eine magische Macht).«u This means that human immediacy secures the har­
mony of God’s potencies; it also means that human subjectivity has the 
capacity for spontaneously accepting its inferiority in comparison to the 
sovereignty of God and that it can perceive God and divine harmony intu­
itively. The fatal point is that when human subjectivity becomes aware of 
this harmony (established by its own subordination under God), it becomes 
self-conscious and the harmony is instantaneously disturbed. Suddenly the 
human subject has turned away from God. It has exercised its freedom and 
caused its own separation from God. The serious result is that the powers 
of irrationality and darkness are let loose, and that they leave the human 
subject with the task of fighting its way back towards the original harmo­
ny through a world infected by darkness, confusion and evil powers. But 
through this battle, it can re-gain the harmony that was lost and can do so 
in a way that does not allow it to be lost a second time because subordination under 
God has been chosen in freedom and because of the acknowledgment of the 
cost it entails to reject God’s sovereignty. This entails that the kind of con­
sciousness gained after this free acceptance of God’s sovereignty is qualita­
tively superior to the kind of consciousness it replaces. In fact, human free­
dom — like divine freedom — is only really possible when God’s freedom 
has re-gained its primacy since this establishes God’s sovereignty on the basis 
of human self-consciousness. In the fallen human being, Schelling remarks, 
»ist der tiefste Abgrund und der höchste Himmel.«15
4. T he Sovereignty o f  G od’s N egative Presence
Schelling argues that because the fallen human being must win back its 
harmonious relatedness to divine reality through a battle against the pow­
ers of evil, human self-consciousness must be a process, or a becoming.
Accordingly, this process is the expression of Gods historical movement 
through human consciousness which, seemingly, places Schelling in the 
company of Hegelian idealism. Still, there is a significant difference 
between the positions of Schelling and Hegel:
Schelling [wirft] Hegel vor, ... dass Hegel seinem Gott zusammen mit 
dem ungehemmten Drang zur Entäusserung den Abfall in eine aussergöt-
tliche Welt zumutet Nicht weil er theistisch, sondern weil er als Deus abscon-
ditus interpretiert ist, hält sich der Schellingsche Gott vom Weltprozess frei}6
In so far as Gods freedom and pure will always have authority over Gods 
necessity, God cannot possibly be exhausted through the course of history. 
Gods freedom always retains an unrevealed aspect in addition to what is 
revealed by God. Therefore, it is necessary for Schelling to define God as 
Deus absconditus; and therefore it remains impossible for Hegel to subscribe 
to Schelling’s God.
It is not the unreachable and hidden part of Schelling s God that makes 
Gods presence negative. Rather, it is the human experience of suffering in 
the process of overcoming the forces of evil. Divine harmony in its imme­
diate and first form is forever lost through the human fall into self-con­
sciousness; but this harmony is still negatively present as a vision of something 
to be re-gained in a way that can secure its irrevocable and eternal reality. 
The significant thing is Schelling s way of preserving Gods absolute sover­
eignty by means of the development of human self-consciousness through 
a successful process of defeating the powers of irrationality and evil. This is 
his response to the problem of evil, and evidence that he regards the human 
fall away from God as a positive, not a negative, event:
Gott in sich selbst betrachtet ist schlechterdings zweck- und sinnlos. 
Seinen Zweck und seinen Sinn kann er nur in einem Anderen finden ... 
das ausser ihm ist und doch wiederum nicht aus seiner Machtsphäre fällt 
... das, indem es seinen eigenen Zweck erfüllt, zugleich, als aus Gott her­
ausgesetzt, den ‘Zweck Gottes’ verwirklicht. Ein solches Anderes ist die 
geschaffene Kreatur.17
5. Powerlessness and Freedom
Recalling Kierkegaards analyses of despair, his problem is to reconcile, on 
one side, the challenge of continually overcoming despair and, on the other,
the vision of reaching the point of complete defeat of despair. In Schulz’ 
interpretation, Kierkegaard’s solution is to acknowledge God’s incarnation 
in Christ as God’s re-instatement of human existence in its full ambiguity, i.e. 
as both inflicted by suffering and successfully defeating suffering. There is a 
striking parallel between this solution and the way Schelling makes the 
human subject’s claim of its own pre-rational existence responsible for the 
closure of idealist thinking. Where Schelling insists on the powerlessness of 
reason, Kierkegaard echoes this insistence, but does so in terms of the pow­
erlessness of existence: As human subjectivity encounters its own limitation 
and powerlessness in the trap of despair, the possibility of freedom and self­
hood is revealed as a miracle of faith. Kierkegaard agrees with Schelling that 
the experience of ultimate powerlessness and the experience of ultimate 
freedom are necessarily co-existent, and that understanding the inter-relat- 
edness of human subjectivity and divine reality is only possible on the basis 
of this paradox. Referring back to Schelling’s redefinition of human sub­
jectivity, our conclusion shall now be that both Kierkegaard and Schelling 
can be said to define human subjectivity as a pre-established and self-affirming 
twofold movement of (Aus-sich-herausgehens> and Tn-sich-zurUckkehrensf8
In spite of this structural agreement between Kierkegaard and 
Schelling, a significant discrepancy between the two lurks. On Schelling’s 
account, human subjectivity is qualified as a reliable source of knowledge 
about God because of the arduous process it goes through in overcoming 
the evil consequences of its own fall into separation from God. As already 
indicated, it is problematic that Schelling’s affirmation of God’s negative 
presence in the world results in an annexation of human subjectivity in 
relation to divine reality in the form of very narrow and speculative analy­
ses of God’s divine nature and metaphysical truth. These analyses seem to 
become his one preoccupation and goal, at the cost of integrating human 
subjectivity and divine reality, or human freedom and divine freedom: 
Schelling places an emphasis on the freedom of God at the expense of 
granting equal weight to the freedom of human subjectivity, the latter of 
which is, in the first place, the very means of access to knowledge about 
divine reality.
As for Kierkegaard, his initial loyalty to a strong anti-subjectivist 
defense of God’s sovereignty paradoxically enough occasions an even more 
loyal commitment to analyzing the inner dynamics of human subjectivity. 
The hope against hope that God will miraculously redeem the self from 
despair is so strongly defined by the human experience of despair that, at 
the expense of discussing God’s nature and redemptive purpose,
Kierkegaard’s focus narrows to an almost exclusive emphasis on the com­
plex dynamics of human nature.
What we are left with is a discrepancy between Schelling and 
Kierkegaard that can be described as follows: Where Schelling annexes 
human subjectivity in relation to divine reality, the reverse happens for 
Kierkegaard, who annexes divine reality in relation to human subjectivity. 
Schelling’s inability to concurrently balance human freedom and divine 
freedom is closely related to the way he responds to the theodicy problem. 
This is also the case with Kierkegaard. The question is how this shared 
inability ties in with the theodicy problem.
6. T h e T h eod icy  Problem
As noted, and contrary to Schulz’ interpretation of Kierkegaard’s analyses 
of despair, it remains a question to what extent equating the power of 
remembrance with the power of redemption is a viable solution to the 
theodicy problem. In order to establish a frame of reference for a discussion 
of this question, I have chosen to introduce some elements from classical 
Christian responses to the theodicy problem.
The Christian tradition has recognized the power of evil as destructive 
of God’s creation. But, as powerful as it is, evil can only destroy; it cannot 
create, or even re-create what it has destroyed. In fact, if a desire for recre­
ation or reconstruction should announce itself, there simply is no capacity 
in evil for the realization of such a desire; only reliance on what is good can 
empower any kind of restoration, or redemption from destructive influ­
ences. Reliance on good, as opposed to evil, is therefore reliance on the 
power of creation in the form it assumes as the power of redemption. On 
this account, the power of redemption has its source in God who is the 
original creator of everything that has existence and being, who is only 
goodness and light, and who conceals no manner of darkness. This is 
thought to explain why evil, although it has the power to inflict inexpress­
ible pain and suffering, still remains empty, insubstantial and disconnected 
from any source of being. Evil only knows how to destroy the goodness of 
the substantiality it lacks for itself; it is therefore something from which one 
must be protected, but it is also something from which one must be 
redeemed when the shield of protection has been penetrated.
The opposition of animosity between the powers of good and evil eas­
ily translates into a dualist world view and an equation of these two pow­
ers. But, along the lines of the Christian tradition, mere power does not
establish the ultimate outcome of the battle between good and evil. Sub­
stantiality, or goodness, does. For while a pursuit of the good leads to the 
restoration of a creation that was harmed by evil, a pursuit of evil solidifies 
the transformation of substantiality into insubstantiality, or emptiness. This 
transformation is conditioned by the destructive influence of evil, but its 
solidification does not occur by means of gradual evaporation and disap­
pearance of substantiality; rather — and this aspect brings our discussion 
back to Kierkegaard -  by culminating in the most radical loss of all: 
Absolute emptiness and the ultimate suffering of having no hope in the 
source from which one can receive one’s self. This experience of emptiness 
is the self realizing the impossibility of annulling its own urge for self-ful­
fillment. Indeed, the most excruciating of all forms of suffering must be the 
entrapment in a despair that desires to be free of the task of becoming what 
one is created to be — but is not granted that freedom. Emptiness is then 
experienced as suffering under the weight of an imposed destination one 
has never aspired to reach; and therefore the experience is one of receiving 
a punishment one has never deserved. This punishment is not so much the 
imposed destination of having to become what some independent source 
of creation has determined, as much as it is the imposed destination of find­
ing absolutely no dispensation from the principles of creation and redemp­
tion. Ultimate death can be desired, but it cannot be executed:
Thus to be sick unto death is to be unable to die, yet not as if there were 
hope of life; no, the hopelessness is that there is not even the ultimate 
hope, death. ... then despair is the hopelessness of not even being able to 
die (SD IS; SV2 11,148).
7. Som e Observations about the Life o f  B ecom in g
Both Schelling and Kierkegaard affirm that human subjectivity finds itself 
shaped by its struggle with the reality of suffering and consequently cannot 
escape going through a developmental process that heightens its awareness 
of divine reality as well as its awareness of itself as essentially becoming.
Although Schelling shows a strong awareness of the self as becoming, 
his firm emphasis on this aspect gradually transforms the becoming of self 
into the becoming of God; earlier, this was termed an annexation of 
human subjectivity in relation to divine reality. In comparison, 
Kierkegaard’s sense of the self’s developmental journey of becoming is not 
as pronounced insofar as the entrapping and imposed nature of despair sig­
nificantly tempers his confidence in the proficiency of pressing forward 
through suffering.
The important observation is that Kierkegaard s annexation of divine 
reality and his narrow focus on the human experience of despair eventual­
ly takes the surprising turn of defining ultimate despair as a loss of hope for 
death, not a loss of hope for life. The problem is not that life challenges the 
self to the point of infliction, but that escaping these sufferings through 
death is not an available option. In my judgment, this reveals an even 
stronger, albeit indirect, affirmation of the developmental nature of the self 
than we have seen argued by Schelling. Unexpectedly, the notion of ulti­
mate loss of hope discloses itself as an impossibility for Kierkegaard in so far 
as hope, per se, proves indestructible: Hope is a principle of creation, and the 
principles of creation, redemption and becoming can be reversed, but they 
cannot be cancelled. For at the end of a reversed process of becoming, the 
suffering of unwanted emptiness awaits; one discovers the consummation 
of the structure of evil — not the freedom of ultimate death.
N otes
1. Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death: A  Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and 
Awakening, trans. HowardV. Hong & Edna H. Hong, 1980 (SD), in Kierkegaards Writings, I-XXV, 
ed. H.V. Hong & E.H. Hong, Princeton, Princeton University Press. References to the Danish edi­
tion, Samlede Værker, 2. ed., ed.A.B. DrachmannJ.L. Heiberg & H.O. Lange, Copenhagen, Gylden­
dalske Boghandel/Nordisk Forlag, 1920-36 (S V 2 ).
2. MichaelTheunissen, »Kierkegaards philosophisches Profil,« Kierkegaardiana 18,1996, pp. 6-27, p. 14.
3. Michael Theunissen, Das Selbst au f dem Grund der Verzweiflung: Kierkegaards negativistische Methode, 
Frankfurt am Main,Verlag Anton Hain, 1991, p. 54.
4. Walter Schulz, Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Vernunft und Freiheit. Søren Kierkegaard: Existenz und System, 
Pfullingen,Verlag Günther Neske, 1977, p. 64.
5. Walter Schulz, Die Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings, Pfullingen,Ver­
lag Günther Neske, 1975, p. 278.
6. EWJ. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung, 1858, in Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings sämtliche 
Werke, 14 vols., ed. K.F.A. Schelling, Stuttgart & Augsburg, J.G. Cotta’scherVerlag, 1856-1861, vol. 
13, p. 7.
7. Manfred Frank, Der unendliche Mangel an Sein: Schellings Hegelkritik und die Anfänge der Marxschen 
Dialektik, München, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1992, p. 215. Italics mine.
8. Schulz, Die Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus, p. 272.
9. Walter Schulz, »Freiheit und Geschichte in Schellings Philosophie,« in F.WJ. Schelling, Philosophis­
che Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1975, p. 23.
10. F.WJ. Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Stuttgart, Philipp Reclam jun., 1995, p. 59.
11. Robert F. Brown, The Later Philosophy o f Schelling:The Influence o f Boehme on the Works o f 1809-1815, 
Cranbury/London, Associated University Presses, 1977, p. 208.
12. F.WJ. Schelling, Die Weltalter, 1861, in Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings sämtliche Werke, 14 vols., 
ed. K.F.A. Schelling, Stuttgart & Augsburg, J.G. Cotta scher verlag, 1856-1861, vol. 8, p. 217.
13. Brown, The Later Philosophy o f Schelling, p. 214.
14. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung, p. 349. Italics mine.
15. Schelling, Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, 1995, p. 77.
16. Michael Theunissen, »Die Dialektik der Offenbarung: Zur Auseinandersetzung Schellings und 
Kierkegaards mit der Religionsphilosophie Hegels,« Philosophisches Jahrbuch 12, ed. Max Müller, 
Freiburg/München,Verlag Karl Alber, 1964, pp. 134-160, p. 147. Italics mine.
17. Schulz, Die Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus, p. 233.
18. Comparing Schelling and Kierkegaard, Schulz advances this point among the final conclusions of 
Die Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus.
